Escaping the Trap: the Simplified Application of Eu Law by Libor Havelka
131CYELP 10 [2014] 131-158
ESCAPING THE TRAP: THE SIMPLIFIED APPLICATION 
OF EU LAW
Libor Havelka*
Summary: While the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on the principles of the domestic application of EU law is at-
tracting plenty of attention, little heed is given to the problems national 
courts have to face when implementing this case law. In this respect, 
this contribution looks at two aspects of the domestic application of 
EU law – the obligation to apply EU law ex officio and the application 
of EU law (namely the general principles of EU law and directives) 
between individuals. Its aim is to identify on specific examples from 
national legal practice the difficulties of national courts when they at-
tempt to follow the case law of the Court of Justice and to put forward 
suggestions on how to simplify the role of national judges and, con-
sequently, enhance the effective application of EU law in the Member 
States. 
1. Introduction 
The accession of a new Member State to the European Union places 
an onerous burden on all legal practitioners, state authorities and es-
pecially on national judges. The latter face a particularly difficult situ-
ation as they have now to deal on a daily basis with the application of 
EU law, including the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter: the Court). Surprisingly enough, even after decades 
of application of EU law in the Member States, some fundamental ques-
tions relating to the domestic application of Union law remain unclear. 
The fundamental principles of domestic application are being eroded by 
a number of exceptions which make it difficult for national judges to 
acquire these principles and to use them in practice. The judgments in 
which the Court departs from its settled case law (eg the application of 
certain legal principles between individuals as a circumvention of the 
prohibition of the direct effect of directives in horizontal relations) usu-
ally receive plenty of attention in academic writing. This can give the 
impression that they have wider applicability than is the case. However, 
it is not easy for national courts, especially those of lower instances, to 
follow these developments given their heavy caseload, the pressure on 
them to reach a quick decision, and various other factors associated with 
national judicial systems.
*	 Doctoral candidate, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.
132 Libor Havelka: Escaping the trap: the Simplified application of EU Law
In this context, the paper focuses on two aspects of the domestic 
application of EU law – the obligation to apply EU law ex officio and the 
application of EU law between individuals. Sections 2 and 3 have the 
same structure. Firstly, part 1 of each section views the relevant case 
law of the Court. Part 2 demonstrates the divergences and difficulties 
resulting from the implementation of the Court’s case law by national 
courts. Part 3 puts forward suggestions as to the possible simplification 
of the principles governing the ex officio application of EU law and the 
horizontal application. Section 3 underlines why these adjustments seem 
necessary. By trying to balance the requirements imposed on a national 
judge by the Court with what it is reasonable to require of and expect 
from national courts, the aim of this contribution is to offer a pragmatic 
view on how to deal with these issues from the standpoint of a national 
judge and to show in these two examples that there are possible ways to 
simplify the principles of the domestic application of EU law and, conse-
quently, enhance the proper application of EU law in the Member States.
2. WHEN: The obligation of a national judge to find and to apply the 
EU norm
After examining a dossier and the facts of the case, the judge finds 
the applicable legal norm, and applies this norm to the facts as they are 
presented to the court by the parties. This is a (simplified) common work-
ing procedure of a judge, which can be subject to modifications depend-
ing on the stage of the proceedings (first instance, appeal, cassation), the 
applicable rules of procedure limiting the ambit of the dispute according 
to the instance, or, generally, the different character of the procedural 
systems in the Member States (from adversarial to inquisitorial). It is not 
unusual for a national judge to find the applicable legal norm within the 
national (or in some cases international) legal order and we can assume 
that this is what judges do on a daily basis. However, with the accession 
of the Member State to the EU, a new legal order of great magnitude has 
to be taken into consideration by the national judge. For the sake of sim-
plicity, let us leave aside the complicated question of whether the case 
falls within the scope of EU law,1 which would normally be the first step 
in considering the application of EU law, and let us suppose that EU law 
is applicable.
1 In this respect, see for instance the following cases from various areas of EU law: Case 
C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzow v austria [1997] ECR I-2629; Case C-328/04 attila Vajnai 
[2005] ECR I-8577; Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] 
ECR I-4273; Case C-457/09 Claude Chartry v Belgian State [2011] ECR I-819; Case C-34/09 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] ECR I-1177; Case C-617/10 Åkl-
agaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013]; Case C-418/11 texdata Software GmbH [2013]; 
Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia [2014]; Case C-628/11 International Jet 
Management GmbH [2014].
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2.1 What the Court of Justice says
Generally speaking, the Court has adopted the ‘one-on-one’ rule re-
garding the obligation of a national judge to raise points of EU law of his 
or her own motion. According to the ‘one-on-one’ rule, whenever national 
law requires courts to raise points of their own motion, the EU law fol-
lows in principle the national rule.2 This follows from the landmark van 
Schijndel case3 in which the Court held that:
where, by virtue of domestic law, courts or tribunals must raise 
of their own motion points of law based on binding domestic 
rules which have not been raised by the parties, such an obliga-
tion also exists where binding Community rules are concerned 
(…).4
Nonetheless, the same principle applies if the domestic law confers 
on courts the mere discretion to apply of their own motion binding rules 
of law.5 It appears that the Court does not distinguish between civil and 
administrative cases in this regard.6
The national procedural rules are subject to scrutiny under the well-
known and sometimes disputed principle of procedural autonomy in the 
form of effectiveness (national law must not be framed in such a way as to 
make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights 
derived from EU law) and equivalence (claims based on EU law must not 
be subject to national rules which are less favourable than those gov-
erning similar domestic actions) tests. Although the Court in principle 
referred the obligation to apply EU law ex officio back to the national level 
by relying on the principle of equivalence, it introduced at the same time 
the ‘contextual effectiveness test’, sometimes called the ‘procedural rule 
of reason’. The contextual approach to effectiveness requires examining 
a national rule, which potentially hinders the application of EU law, in 
context by considering the role of the provision in question in the proce-
dure, its progress and special features, taking into account also the basic 
principles of the domestic judicial system, such as the principle of legal 
certainty, protection of the rights to defence and the proper conduct of 
2 HJ Snijders and S Vogenauer (eds), Content and Meaning of National Law in the Context 
of transnational Law (Sellier European Law Publishers 2009) 134.
3 Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93 Jereon van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysio-
therapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705.
4 Van Schijndel (n 3) para 13.
5 Van Schijndel (n 3) para 14.
6 See Joined Cases C-222/05 J van der Weerd and Others, C-223/05 H de Rooy sr and 
H de Rooy jr, C-224/05 Maatschap H en J van’t Oever and Others, C-225/05 BJ van Mid-
dendorp v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007] ECR I-4233; or Case 
C-72/95 aannemersbedrijf PK Kraaijeveld BV ea v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland 
[1996] ECR I-5403.
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procedure.7 It is the contextual effectiveness test which led to the differ-
ent outcomes adopted by the Court in the judgments van Schijndel and 
Peterbroeck, rendered on the same day.8
The Court has stepped out beyond the realms of equivalence on a 
number of occasions and has found that national courts are obliged to go 
beyond the ambit of the dispute set by the parties and the requirements 
of national law in order to protect matters of public policy or other fun-
damental public interests. Basically, two lines of cases have emerged in 
this respect. 
The first, manifested for instance in Eco Swiss or Manfredi,9 con-
cerns EU competition law rules as matters of public policy. In Eco Swiss, 
the Court took the view that the national civil court, reviewing an arbitra-
tional award, should annul the award if the award infringes EU competi-
tion law rules, even if in the domestic proceedings the national judge can 
of his or her own motion annul the award regarded as contrary to public 
policy; however, under national law, the non-application of competition 
law is not deemed contrary to public policy. Therefore, it is sometimes 
argued that the Court developed the concept of European public policy, 
comprising Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which must be automatically ap-
plied by the national court.10
The second strand of cases concerns the ex officio application of 
EU consumer law.11 The Court held that national courts must abandon 
judicial passivity in order to ensure that consumer rights, mainly under 
7 Van Schijndel (n 3) para 19; and Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS 
v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599, para 14. See also H Schebesta, ‘Does the National Court 
Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Application after Asturcom’ (2010) 18 European 
Review of Private Law.
8 For a debate on the reasons which led the Court to the different solutions, see eg J Eng-
ström, ‘National Courts’ Obligation to Apply Community Law Ex Officio: The Court Showing 
New Respect for Party Autonomy and National Procedural Autonomy?’ (2008) Review of 
European Administrative Law 67.
9 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055; and 
Joined Cases C-295/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd adriatico assicurazioni Spa, C-296/04 
antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai Spa, C-297/04 Nicolo tricarico v assitalia Spa, C-298/04 
Pasqualina Murgolo v assitalia Spa [2006] ECR I-6619.
10 A Kaczorowska, European Union Law (Routledge 2013) 250.
11 See notably Joined Cases C-240/98 Océano Grupo Editorial Sa v Roció Murciano Quin-
tero, C-241/98 Salvat Editores Sa v José M. Sánchez alcón Prades, C-242/98 José Luis 
Copano Badillo, C-243/98 Mohammed Berroane, C-244/98 Emilio Viñas Feliú [2000] ECR 
I-4941; and Cases C-473/00 Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout [2002] ECR I-10875; Case 
C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421; Case 
C-429/05 Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanne Godard, née Rampion v Franfinance SA and K 
par K SaS [2007] ECR I-8017; Case C-40/08 asturcom telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina 
Rodríguez Nogueira [2009] ECR I-9579; Case C-488/11 Dirk Frederik asbeek Brusse and 
Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV [2013]. See also S Moracchini-Zeidenberg, ‘La CJUE, 
le relevé d’office et les droits de la défense’ (2013) 16 La Semaine Juridique Entreprise et 
Affaires.
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the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, are sufficiently protected.12 For in-
stance, in Mostaza Claro the Court stated that:
the nature and importance of the public interest underlying the 
protection which the Directive confers on consumers justify, 
moreover, the national court being required to assess of its own 
motion whether a contractual term is unfair, compensating in 
this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer 
and the seller or supplier.13 
In asturcom, the Court found that Article 6 of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive must be regarded as a provision of equal standing to 
national rules which rank, within the domestic legal system, as rules of 
public policy. According to one commentator, the Court has created an 
indirect form of European public policy which, in contrast to true public 
policy, remains contingent on the national legal system having an excep-
tion for public policy.14 According to another, the Court treats certain 
provisions15 as an overarching concept of European public policy in the 
context of national procedure law.16
2.2 Practice of national courts
It is not easy to ascertain how national courts, in their practice, 
interpret and follow the rules set by the Court. Access especially to the 
case law of the courts of lower instances remains limited, although it is 
precisely their approach to the ex officio application of EU law which is 
of crucial importance. It is almost impossible to estimate the number of 
cases in which EU law should have been applied but where the national 
court did not do so, whether intentionally or unintentionally, and where 
the parties did not invoke EU law either. At times, we learn about these 
cases from the judgments of the higher courts, for instance when one of 
the parties raises EU law arguments at a later stage of the proceedings. 
Nonetheless, national procedural rules often limit the possibility to raise 
new legal and factual arguments before the appeal or cassation courts. 
12 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
[1993] OJ L95/29.
13 Mostaza Claro (n 11) para 38.
14 H Schebesta, ‘Does the National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Ap-
plication after Asturcom’ (2010) 18 European Review of Private Law.
15 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; Article 6(1) Unfair Contract Terms Directive; Article 11(2) 
Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC; and Article 4 Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577/
EEC.
16 See M Ebers, ‘Mandatory Consumer Law, Ex Officio Application of European Union Law 
and Res Judicata: From Océano to Asturcom’ (2010) 18 European Review of Private Law.
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This was the case in the recent decision of the Curia of Hungary (Hungar-
ian Supreme Court), where the plaintiff submitted a petition for an ex-
traordinary review, raising a point of law concerning collision with EU law 
which had not been raised before in the course of the main procedure.17 
According to the plaintiff, the court of first instance should have recog-
nised ex officio the contradiction between a national and EU law pro-
vision, namely Council Regulation 73/2009 establishing common rules 
for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural 
policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers. Under the 
Hungarian rules of civil procedure, an extraordinary review procedure 
before the Curia cannot be initiated by referring to a violation of law that 
was not addressed in the main procedure. The Curia viewed the relevant 
case law of the Court18 and recalled the contextual test derived from the 
Court’s case law – namely that  the entire procedure has to be taken into 
consideration in order to establish whether issues concerning the inter-
pretation of EU law that were not raised during the main procedure can 
be raised before the review court. As there are no rules within the Hun-
garian civil procedure that restrict the application of EU law compared to 
national law, the Curia found that under such circumstances the review 
court is not obliged to examine new points of EU law raised by the parties 
for the first time in the review procedure. The review court should au-
tonomously decide whether in such a case it examines the collision of the 
EU law with a national provision and whether it submits a preliminary 
reference to the Court.  
The analysis of the Italian administrative courts’ practice shows 
some interesting results.19 At the beginning of the 90s, before the Court 
handed down its landmark judgments concerning the ex officio applica-
tion of EU law, van Schijndel and Peterbroeck, the Italian administra-
tive courts seemed fairly open to the application of (at that time) EC law 
of its own motion, even where the parties did not claim its violation.20 
The Italian courts derived their argument from the Court’s judgment in 
Verholen,21 but in fact they went even further by asserting that the na-
17 Case No Kfv IV 35, 402/2012/4, Curia of Hungary (Judgment of 4 June 2013).
18 The Curia referred to van Schijndel (n 3); Peterbroeck (n 7); Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zen-
tralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 
I-1989; and Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie aG and Others 
[2013].
19 M Eliantonio, ‘The Application of EC Law Ex Officio: Some News From the Italian Admin-
istrative Courts’ (2008) 2 Review of European Administrative Law.
20 Case No 532, Regional Administrative Court Lombardia (Judgment of 1 July 1993).
21 Joined Cases C-87-89/90 a Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank amsterdam 
[1991] ECR I-3757. The Verholen judgment is referred to as the first decision of the Court 
dealing with the ex officio application of EC law. However, in Verholen, the Court merely 
stated that ‘(...) the recognized right of an individual to rely, in certain conditions, before a 
national court, on a directive where the period for transposing it has expired does not pre-
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tional court was under the obligation to examine ex officio the compat-
ibility of a national rule with EC law.22 Subsequently, after the Court’s 
decisions in van Schijndel and Peterbroeck, Italian courts stepped back 
from their previous case law and began rather to emphasise the principle 
of party autonomy.23 For instance, according to the Council of State, if 
the grounds based on the alleged unlawfulness of the EC measure, order-
ing the Italian government to recover State aid, raised by the parties in 
order to claim the invalidity of a national administrative decision, are not 
explicitly put forward in accordance with the national procedural rules, a 
national court is not authorised to consider of its own motion this point.24 
Likewise, the Italian administrative courts decided that they were not au-
thorised to examine of their own motion the collision between a national 
administrative measure and EU rules on public procurement, which was 
not put forward by the applicant.25 Nonetheless, it has been argued that 
the Italian courts in their rulings adopted the Court’s case law based on 
the principle of equivalence in an incomplete manner. More specifically, 
they did not perform the ‘contextual effectiveness test’ and did not ex-
amine the nature, aim and purpose of the rule in question, which raises 
doubts as to the sustainability and efficiency of the Court’s case law if 
this turns out to be the prevalent approach of the national courts in other 
Member States, too.26  
As for the Polish (civil) courts, they seem to adhere to the equivalence 
principle and derive the scope of the obligation to apply EU law ex officio 
mainly from the national procedure rules.27 Therefore, the obligation de-
pends largely on the distinction between substantive and procedural law 
and on the stage of proceedings – the Polish courts of first and second 
instance should apply substantive EU law on their own motion whereas 
the second-instance courts are generally not obliged to take into account 
on their own motion infringements of EU procedural law.28 The situation 
is even more specific in the cassation proceedings before the Polish Su-
preme Court where Polish procedural law prevents the Supreme Court 
from controlling infringements which have not been indicated in the cas-
clude the power for the national court to take that directive into consideration even if the 
individual has not relied on it’, without further elaboration of the ex officio application.
22 Case No 267, Regional Administrative Court Lombardia (Judgment of 5 April 1994); 
Case No 602 (Judgment of 16 July 1994); Case No 327, Council of State of Italia (Order of 
8 May 1995).
23 Case No 6657, Council of State of Italia (Judgment of 5 December 2002).
24 Case No 516, Council of State of Italia (Judgment of 16 February 2005).
25 Case No 1354, Regional Administrative Court of Sicily (Judgment of 30 May 2006).
26 Eliantonio (n 19).
27 T Ereciński, ‘When Must National Judges Raise European Law Issues on Their own Mo-
tion?’ (2010) ERA Forum, November 2010.
28 With the exception of fundamental procedural questions such as the jurisdiction of Pol-
ish courts and the recognition and declaration of the enforceability of judgments.
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sation complaint, save in the case of the invalidity of the proceedings.29 
However, the Supreme Court ruled that it can go beyond this limitation 
when the Supreme Court is obliged as the court of last instance to re-
quest a preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, when 
the subject matter of the Polish and EU law provision is identical but the 
applicant refers solely to the Polish law and the indirect application of EU 
law is possible or when it is necessary to interpret national legal provi-
sions in the light of EU law.30 The latter situations occur typically when 
the applicant indicates, as a ground for a cassation complaint, a national 
provision which incorrectly implements EU law or when the applicant 
refers to a national provision incompatible with the directly applicable 
EU norm. In line with this approach, the Supreme Court, for instance, al-
lowed the claim of a male Polish conductor for early retirement although 
the Polish law granted this possibility only to female conductors. By rais-
ing the EU law ex officio, the Supreme Court held that the unjustified 
discrimination based on sex is contrary to Council Directive 79/7/EEC.31 
In France, trial judges (juges du fond) and judges of the cassation 
jurisdictions are obliged to raise purely legal grounds (moyens de pur 
droit) stemming from EU law in the same manner as the legal grounds 
based on national law, according to the principle of equivalence set by 
the Court. The obligation of a judge to apply ex officio a legal norm to the 
facts follows from the relevant articles of the French Code of Civil Proce-
dure.32 On the other hand, the Code of Civil Procedure also stresses in 
its Article 16 the adversarial aspect of the procedure, putting the French 
system somewhere in between party autonomy and judicial passivity.33 
The judgment of the appellate court, in which the judge does not raise the 
(purely) legal ground stemming from EU law, is at risk of being annulled 
by the Court of Cassation, be it because the applicant puts forward an 
EU law argument for the first time in the proceedings before the Court 
of Cassation, or the Court of Cassation itself raises the EU law grounds 
29 Article 398 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure.
30 Case No II PK 17/06, Supreme Court of Poland (Judgment of 18 December 2006); and 
Ereciński (n 27).
31 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ 
L6/24. See Case No I UK 182/07, Supreme Court of Poland (Judgment of 4 January 2008); 
and T Ereciński (n 27).
32 Article 12 says: ‘The judge settles the dispute in accordance with the rules of law ap-
plicable thereto. He must give or restore their proper legal definitions to the disputed facts 
and deeds notwithstanding the denominations given by the parties [...]’. Articles 619 and 
620 govern the scope of the review by the Court of Cassation.
33 Article 16 paras 2 and 3 say: ‘In his decision, the judge may take into consideration 
grounds, explanations and documents, relied upon or produced by the parties only if the 
parties had an opportunity to discuss them in an adversarial manner. He shall not base his 
decision on legal arguments that he has raised sua ponte without having first invited the 
parties to comment thereon’.
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of its own motion. The situation is somewhat different when it comes to 
raising of its motion a combination of factual and legal grounds (moyens 
mélangés de fait et de droit). Trial judges may raise the combination of 
factual and legal grounds under the national law; however, within the 
ambit of the dispute they are required to do so under EU law by virtue 
of the principle of effectiveness. In principle, such an obligation does not 
apply to the Court of Cassation as its judges are judges of the law (juges 
du droit) and not of the facts.34 
There are a number of judgments of the Court of Cassation where 
it raised EU points of law of its own motion. It invoked ex officio, for 
instance, the articles of the Treaty on the free movement of goods and 
on the prohibition of customs duties or charges having equivalent effect 
in order to liberate an undertaking from the obligation to pay a transit 
charge,35 or the Social Security Schemes Regulation.36 The Court of Cas-
sation also engaged itself in the interpretation of national law in conform-
ity with EU law. For instance, it interpreted of its own motion the relevant 
provisions of the Labour Code in conformity with the Directive on the 
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertak-
ings, and annulled the challenged judgments;37 in a similar manner, the 
Court of Cassation interpreted the national law in conformity with the 
directive concerning the safety of workers.38 However, the intricate ques-
tion of the application of the iura novit curia principle under the French 
law came through initially in the area of consumer law, where the French 
legislator, after the Rampion case, amended the relevant articles of the 
Consumer Code, enabling the courts to raise ex officio all the provisions 
codified in the Consumer Code regardless of their status of public policy, 
and the Cassation Court subsequently reversed its former position.39
34 See, also for an overview of the case law of the Court of Cassation on the matter, D Simon, 
‘La pratique de la fonction juridictionnelle’, 3e partie du rapport annuel de la Cour de cassa-
tion de 2006 (la Cour de cassation et la construction juridique européenne) n° 1-2-2-1.
35 Case No 91-18964, Court of Cassation (Judgment of 27 February 1996). See also the 
Court’s ruling in Case C-16/94 Édouard Dubois et Fils and Général Cargo Services Sa 
[1995] ECR I-2432.
36 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community. 
See Case No 98-46422, Court of Cassation (Judgment of 5 June 2001).
37 Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employ-
ees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses OJ 
L201/88. See Court of Cassation, Judgment of 24 February 2004 No 01-40714, 01-40715, 
01-40716, 01-43.982, 01-40717.
38 Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to en-
courage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work OJ L183/1. See Case No 
05-41555, Court of Cassation (Judgment of 28 February 2006).
39 Case No 05-20176, Court of Cassation (Judgment of 22 January 2009); Case No 11-
12160 (Judgment of 12 April 2012); Case No 11-17528 (Judgment of 12 July 2012).
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2.3 Simplifying the obligation to apply EU law ex officio
As Advocate General Jacobs argued in his opinion in Van Schijndel, 
if the view were taken that national procedural rules must always yield to 
Union law, it would unduly subvert the established principles underlying 
the legal systems of the Member States.40 In the absence of harmonised 
rules on remedies, procedure and time limits, a degree of disparity in the 
application of EU law is inevitable.41 Although the differences between 
procedures within the Member States might not be as great as believed,42 
the outlined practice in some of the above-mentioned national jurisdic-
tions shows that considerable divergences in raising points of law of their 
own motion still exist among national legal systems. An obligation to 
raise EU law ex officio regardless of the national procedural rules, if im-
posed on national judges by the Court, would probably be heavily disre-
garded. The is all the more true if we consider how often national courts 
overlook the requirements of the Court under the current regime, based 
predominantly on the principle of equivalence which (in most cases) does 
not require national judges to set aside national procedural rules. As 
previously mentioned, it is almost impossible to estimate the number 
of cases in which EU law should have been applied ex officio but where 
the national courts did not do so. There are, however, some indications 
that the number of such cases remains significant (except in specialised 
jurisdictions, eg competition law). For instance, the International Depart-
ment of the Czech Supreme Court conducted two surveys concerning the 
application of EU law by the Czech civil courts during 2004–2008 and 
2009–2011. The courts of lower instances were asked to provide the In-
ternational Department with the judgments in which they applied EU law 
during the respective periods. Regarding the 2009–2011 period, out of 98 
courts requested, 16 courts reported that EU law had not been applied in 
any single case.43 Certainly, it would not be valid to make generalisations 
on the courts in the whole of the EU based only on the data collected in 
one of the (relatively recent) Member States. Some data on the familiar-
ity of national judges with EU law, however, suggest that the situation is 
perhaps not hugely different, even in some old Member States. Accord-
ing to a survey in which around 300 judges from the Netherlands and 
Germany participated, 45.2% of respondents stated that it was totally 
unclear to them when they must apply EU law ex officio.44 Furthermore, 
40 Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93 Jereon van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysio-
therapeuten ECR I-4705, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 27.
41 ibid, para 45.
42 ibid, para 34.
43 L Havelka, A Kondelová, A Pavel, K Šipulová, Aplikace unijního práva českými civilními 
soudy 2009-2011 [The Application of Union Law by the Czech Civil Courts 2009-2011] (Su-
preme Court of the Czech Republic 2013).
44 See the summary report of a survey on the knowledge of EU law among Dutch and Ger-
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some indications confirming this presumption can be found in the rele-
vant literature. For instance, Sacha Prechal, who derived her conclusions 
predominantly from personal experience and contacts with the national 
judiciary, mentions that it seems that even after decades of EU member-
ship national judges (including the younger generation) are still strug-
gling somewhat with EU law rather than smoothly applying it.45
Under these circumstances, it would seem more appropriate to keep 
the principles governing the ex officio application of EU law rather sim-
ple. The contextual effectiveness test and competition and consumer law 
exceptions presumably do not fit into this approach. As for the contex-
tual effectiveness test introduced by the Court, judgments of national 
courts can be found which at least refer to or even try to perform the test 
(the above-mentioned decision of the Curia of Hungary) but it is doubt-
ful whether we can assume that the test has become a standard tech-
nique used by the judges when they assess whether the national pro-
cedural rules hinder the ex officio application of EU law. The test has 
been criticised mainly for the lack of predictability and impracticality, 
and has even been marked as a ‘practically impossible – excessively dif-
ficult’ test.46 Likewise, the ambiguous specification of the areas of law 
(so far, competition and consumer law, and it is not clear whether the 
Court will expand this approach to other areas of EU law in the future), 
where the principle of equivalence requires national courts to disregard a 
national rule and to apply EU law ex officio, contributes to a weakening 
of legal certainty and may cause undesirable side effects. For instance, 
under Dutch law a judge cannot go beyond the ambit of the dispute, with 
the exception of matters of public order; as consumer law is not regarded 
as a matter of public order, the consumer should invoke the unfairness 
of a term so that the court could disregard the term. The case law of 
the Court, which requires national courts to review ex officio potentially 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, led to an intensive debate in legal 
doctrine and to conflicting judgments of courts of lower instances, until 
the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) ruled on the matter in September 2013.47 
Additionally, the question of how to implement this case law of the Court, 
which would intrude rather extensively in national procedural autonomy, 
man judges ‘The court is not so sure about the law – national judges and EU law’ (2010) 
<http://legalresearchnetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/PaperTobiasNowakGron-
ingen.doc> accessed 31 March 2014.
45 S Prechal, ‘National Courts in EU Judicial Structures’ (2007) Yearbook of European Law 
2006, 432.
46 A Lo Faro, ‘Judicial Enforcement of EC Labour Law: Time Limits, Burden of Proof, Ex 
Officio Application of EC Law’ (2002) I Working Papers Centro studi di Diritto del Lavoro 
Europeo. 
47 Case No 12/00395, Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Judgment of 13 September 
2013).
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may result in national courts overlooking the EU law dimension in the 
relevant cases.48
It appears that in the debate about competing principles, the con-
textual assessment of the norms, and (European) public order or public 
interest, the core of the problem has been somehow overshadowed. The 
question rather scarcely raised is to which EU norms the obligation of the 
ex officio application should relate, or, in other words, what would it be 
reasonable to require from the national judges in this respect. The issue 
which arises in this regard is how to classify the EU norms, and how to 
lay down the demarcation lines between their categories in order to de-
termine which points of EU law should be obligatorily raised by national 
judges. It is not generally disputed that when a national judge is obliged 
under national law to find the applicable norm and to apply it to the 
facts presented by the parties, he or she is obliged to search for the ap-
plicable norm not only within the national legal system, but also to take 
into account EU regulations, which are legally binding in every Member 
State, similar to national laws.49 The situation remains more ambiguous 
when it comes to ex officio conform interpretation by national courts. The 
prevalent view is seemingly in favour of a broad understanding of the ex 
officio obligation, so when national courts have to raise EU law of their 
own motion, they also have to interpret national law in the light of the 
EU norms in line with the doctrine of consistent interpretation (indirect 
effect).50 Needless to say, in practice, this mostly amounts to a demand 
to find wrongly implemented or non-implemented directives and to use 
them as an interpretative tool.
In order to facilitate comprehension of the domestic application of 
EU law for national judges, the basic principles of the domestic applica-
tion of EU law are sometimes likened to the usage of principles which 
are already known to judges in the domestic legal orders. The doctrine of 
conform interpretation is considered to resemble conform interpretation 
in the light of the Constitution or the interpretation of domestic laws in 
48 At times, the national court is well aware of the European element in the (consumer) 
case at hand and achieves the result sought by the directive without expressly referring to 
it. See Case No II Pl. ÚS 3406/10, Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Judgment of 
14 March 2013). This is also not a fully desirable outcome, especially in the case of courts 
of higher instances, whose judgments should have a pedagogical impact on lower courts.
49 And, possibly also EU Treaties, as the Court has derived the direct effect of some of its 
provisions on a number of occasions.
50 For instance, see the Opinion of AG Darmon in Verholen, where he held that the primacy 
of Community law cannot be left to the discretion of the national courts, without the risk 
of its uniform application being seriously compromised; therefore, a national court is un-
der the duty to raise of its own motion the existence of a Community rule with regard both 
to Community rules which have direct effect and to those which do not have such effect. 
Joined Cases C-87-89/90 a Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank amsterdam 
ECR I-3782, Opinion of AG Darmon.
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line with international treaties. In this respect, it should be recalled that 
when national judges examine the conformity of national ordinary legisla-
tion with EU law, they compare national provisions against a backdrop of 
a totally different magnitude. It can hardly be contested that national law 
is increasingly based on, or at least influenced by, EU law. The national 
legislation is becoming more and more ‘Europeanised’. There is probably 
no accurate way of calculating the percentage of national laws based on 
EU legislation. A survey of the House of Commons Library elaborated in 
2010 estimates that the proportion of national laws based on EU legisla-
tion in EU Member States varies widely, ranging from 6% to 84%.51 The 
data show that even though the numbers of domestic laws directly in-
fluenced by Brussels are sometimes overestimated, a significant part of 
national legal orders has its origin in EU law. 
Sometimes it is clear from the text of a law that the concrete norm at 
hand is a transposition of EU legislation. Legislative drafting guidelines 
and instructions in the Member States may also prescribe that it be stat-
ed in the text of the law that the adopted legislation has its origin in EU 
law.52 However, it is difficult or at times almost impossible to ascertain 
at first glance that the judge is applying a transposed norm. Regarding 
harmonious interpretation, in the survey on the knowledge of EU law 
among Dutch and German judges mentioned in footnote 44, 37% of all 
judges said they did not know what the Court expects of them as to the 
interpretation of national law in harmony with EU directives, and 41% 
answered it was only partly clear to them. One of the commentaries also 
aimed at the difficulties in identifying the issues of EU law – when a judge 
does not know that national law is based on a directive, he or she cannot 
interpret it in harmony with the directive. The scope of EU law is expand-
ing rapidly, and the times when European legislation consisted mainly of 
economic, fiscal or social regulations are long gone. From the perspective 
of a national judge, the obligation to ex officio raise points of EU law in 
an absolute form would amount to requiring national judges to verify in 
advance almost every provision of national law before applying it, in order 
to ascertain whether it is an implementation of EU legislation or not. 
In order to bring the requirements concerning the ex officio applica-
tion of EU law, imposed on national judges, more in line with reality, it 
51 The proportion of EU-based national law depends on various factors, including the area 
of law concerned, the length of EU membership, the methods of transposition, etc. See 
further House of Commons Library, ‘How Much Legislation Comes from Europe?’ (2010) 
Research Paper 10/62, 13 October 2010 <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP10-62.
pdf> accessed 31 March 2014. 
52 See for instance the Guidelines for the fulfilment of legislative obligations arising out of 
the Czech Republic’s Membership in the European Union <https://isap.vlada.cz/home-
page2.nsf/pages/esd/$file/mp.pdf ‎> accessed 31 March 2014. Moreover, national imple-
mentation measures must be notified to the Commission.
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seems appropriate to simplify these requirements. With regard to the ex-
pansion of EU law (and the limited knowledge of EU law among national 
judges related thereto) and the burdensome obligation of harmonious 
interpretation (which hardly resembles the other types of harmonious 
interpretation that national judges are accustomed to), the question is 
whether it would not be preferable to exempt national judges from the 
duty to interpret ex officio national law in the light of EU directives.53 
Inevitably, this approach would warrant increased effort on the part of 
the EU institutions and national authorities in order to ensure the high 
conformity of the transposing measures with the directives. The Commis-
sion has already put in place some arrangements to tackle the compli-
ance deficit, such as the EU Pilot platform.54 However, it is sometimes 
argued that the Commission lacks sufficient capacity to deal comprehen-
sively with this task and to enforce the correct implementation of direc-
tives.55 The European Parliament is also involved in assessing the tools 
developed at EU level to promote compliance, such as the infringement 
procedure, correlation tables, scoreboards, transposition and implemen-
tation plans, inspections, etc.56 The Parliament also called in the past for 
increased cooperation between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament to reinforce control of transposition measures at the national 
level.57  These efforts need to be strengthened so as to minimise the risk of 
applying incorrectly transposed national legislation and to prevent diver-
gences in national jurisdictions. The Court may also contribute to clari-
fying and simplifying the ex officio application of EU law. It should very 
carefully consider when the principle of effectiveness of EU law requires 
national courts to go beyond national procedural rules and to precisely 
define these cases in order to provide national courts with unequivocal 
and sufficiently clear guidelines.
These steps would certainly not bring a solution to all the problems 
described above. National judges would still have to become familiar with 
a significant part of EU legislation. Still, it would arguably make the re-
quirements imposed on national courts more feasible.
53 Naturally, national judges would remain obliged to take into consideration the directives 
at the request of the parties invoking their indirect or vertical direct effect (if national law 
permits parties to raise this argument at the given stage of the proceedings).
54 See the Commission’s communication ‘A Europe of results – Applying Community law’ 
COM (2007) 502 final; and the Commission’s ‘30th Annual Report on monitoring the appli-
cation of EU law’ COM (2013) 726.
55 B Steunenberg, ‘Is Big Brother Watching? Commission Oversight of the National Imple-
mentation of EU Directives’ (2010) 11 European Union Politics.
56 European Parliament, ‘Tools for Ensuring Implementation and Application of EU Law 
and Evaluation of their Effectiveness’ (2013) PE 493.014.
57 European Parliament, ‘Comparative Study on the Transposition of EC Law in the Mem-
ber States’ (2007) PE 378.294.
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3. HOW: The horizontal application of EU law 
Once the relevant EU norm is found and the national judge decides 
to apply it, another delicate issue appears – the effects of EU law within 
the national legal system. Certainly, plenty of attention has been paid 
over the years to the primacy of EU law, its direct and indirect effect, state 
liability for breaches of EU law, and related issues. All of these principles 
have their limits, exceptions and yet unexplored connotations. Nonethe-
less, especially one aspect of the principles of the domestic application of 
EU law remains particularly unclear in spite of its great significance for 
national legal practice – the horizontal effects of EU law, ie the applica-
tion of certain EU legislation between individuals, namely directives and 
general principles of EU law. It has become clear that directives and gen-
eral principles of EU law may produce different types of horizontal effect, 
particularly indirect or incidental horizontal effect. In recent years, the 
opacity of the issue at hand has increased with the legally binding Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: the Charter), contain-
ing rights which are in certain cases further implemented through direc-
tives, raising again the question of the (potential) horizontal effect of the 
rights enshrined in directives. Taking account of the growing relevance 
of these developments, it is essential to provide national judges who deal 
increasingly with these cases with appropriate guidance.  
3.1 What the Court of Justice says
For the sake of simplicity, we will set aside the horizontal application 
of Treaty provisions,58 regulations,59 and decisions,60 as they do not pose 
significant problems. Attention will mainly be given, as previously sug-
gested, to directives and general principles of EU law.
58 The Court has established direct effect of Treaty provisions repeatedly in its case law, in-
cluding their horizontal direct effect. See for instance Cases C-36/74 BNO Walrave and LJN 
Koch v association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and 
Federación Española Ciclismo [1974]; C-281/98 Roman angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di 
Bolzano Spa [2000] ECR I-4139; C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale transporte 
und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659; C-438/05 International transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti 
[2007] ECR I-10779.
59 The direct effect of regulations is generally presumed, including horizontal relationships. 
See Article 288 TFEU.
60 The direct effect of decisions depends generally on their nature – decisions addressed 
to an individual (or individuals) are binding on this individual or individuals; decisions ad-
dressed to a Member State might produce vertical direct effect (see Case C-156/91 Hansa 
Fleisch Ernst Mundt GmbH & Co KG proti Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg [1992] 
ECR I-5567), although their horizontal direct effect is excluded (see Case C-80/06 Carp Snc 
di L Moleri e V Corsi v Ecorad Srl [2007] ECR I-4473).
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Since the Court’s decision in Marshall,61 the classic narrative says 
that the direct effect of directives cannot be extended to horizontal situ-
ations – directives are in the first place addressed to the Member States, 
which implies that individuals are not obliged to follow them. For that 
reason, directives cannot lay duties on individuals. A number of excep-
tions to this general rule have been introduced by the Court. The most 
important of these is the horizontal application of the general principles 
of EU law and the indirect effect of directives (conform interpretation).
In its (in)famous decision in Mangold,62 the Court held that the gen-
eral principle of equality is capable of horizontal direct effect, stating that: 
…it is the responsibility of the national court, hearing a dispute 
involving the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, 
to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protection 
which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to 
ensure that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any pro-
vision of national law which may conflict with that law.63 
In Mangold, the Court noted that the directive64 at hand (whose 
period prescribed for transposition had not yet expired at the material 
time) did not itself lay down the general principle, but only established a 
general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds covered 
by the directive.65 In subsequent case law, namely in Kücükdeveci,66 the 
Court further specified (in relation to the same principle and directive, 
whose implementation period had already expired at that time) that the 
principle of non-discrimination in respect of age can apply if the case falls 
within the scope of EU law which, inter alia, requires the expiry of the 
implementation period of the directive.67 Once again, the directive does 
not lay down the principle of equal treatment but merely gives expression 
to it.68 
Regarding the line of cases concerning the application of general 
principles of EU law between private persons, in which the matter was 
61 Case C-152/84 MH Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire area Health 
authority [1986] ECR 723.
62 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981.
63 Mangold (n 62) para 77.
64 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
65 For a critical assessment of Mangold, see for instance T Papadopoulos ‘Criticizing the 
Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU General Principle of Equality’ (2011) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review.
66 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365.
67 ibid, paras 23-25.
68 ibid, para 50.
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brought within the scope of the EU law by virtue of the Treaties,69 the 
question arose about what can in fact determine the applicability of gen-
eral principles. As the Court ruled that in order to attract the application 
of a general principle, the Treaty provision bringing the matter within the 
scope of EU law must have direct effect,70 one can ask why, if a rule falls 
within the scope of a Treaty provision without direct effect, it should not 
attract the application of the general principle but that the result is re-
versed when it comes to a directive without direct effect.71 Another con-
troversial issue is the extent of the applicability of general principles, and, 
more concretely, whether these principles can merely exclude conflicting 
national rules or even substitute them. This raises the question about 
why the directive cannot impose exclusionary effects, but such effects can 
be imposed by virtue of a general principle triggered by that directive.72
These issues have become even more relevant with the legally bind-
ing Charter with regard to the general principles of EU law, which are 
embodied in the articles of the Charter. The text of the Charter distin-
guishes between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’. In general, no subjective right 
can be derived from provisions considered as principles. Nevertheless, 
certain implementing acts concretising a principle (eg a directive) can 
serve as a benchmark for the legality of national (implementing) acts. In a 
recent case, association de médiation sociale,73 concerning an incorrectly 
implemented directive which specified the rights enshrined in Article 27 
of the Charter (considered a principle under the Charter’s terminology), 
the Court took the view that a person whose rights are specified in a 
directive not properly implemented and who is in conflict with another 
private party cannot rely on the directive before the (national) court if the 
rights are not precisely named in the Charter. In other words, the Court 
did not grant the horizontal direct effect of the worker’s right to informa-
tion and consultation enshrined in the Charter.74 It has to be added that 
69 Cases C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich 
Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689; C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and 
Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; 
C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnad-
sarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767.
70 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge 
GmbH [2008] ECR I-7245.
71 See E Spaventa, ‘The Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights as General Prin-
ciples of Union Law’ in Anthony Arnull and others (eds), a Constitutional Order of States: 
Essays in Honour of alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011).
72 ibid.
73 Case C-176/12 association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGt and 
Others (15 January 2014).
74 See commentary in F Riem, ‘L’invocabilité de la Charte des droits fondamentaux et le 
droit du travail: «avec toi je suis toujours dans l’incertain»’ [2014] ELSJ <http://www.gdr-
elsj.eu/2014/01/25/elsj/linvocabilite-de-la-charte-des-droits-fondamentaux-et-le-droit-
du-travail-avec-toi-je-suis-toujours-dans-lincertain/> accessed 31 March 2014.
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Advocate General Villalón in his Opinion suggested allowing some sort of 
horizontal direct effect of a directive implementing a principle embedded 
in the Charter;75 it is therefore apparent that opinions of this kind exist 
in the Court and one cannot be fully sure about the future developments 
of the Court’s case law.
The principle of indirect effect does not encompass only the harmo-
nious interpretation of national law in conformity with directives; all na-
tional law, including provisions not specifically enacted for the purposes 
of implementation, should be interpreted in accordance with all EU law.76 
It is, however, the indirect effect of directives which usually entails diffi-
culties in the practice of national courts, taking into account its possible 
horizontal application. Given its less ‘intrusive’ nature from the vantage 
point of the national legal order compared to direct effect, indirect effect 
may seem less controversial and more frequently used, which all the more 
underlines the importance of this principle. Under the doctrine of indirect 
effect, national authorities, including courts, should interpret national 
law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the direc-
tive.77 The principle of interpreting national law in conformity with EU 
law has certain limitations, namely interpretative methods recognised 
by national law,78 general principles of law, interpretation contra legem,79 
and non-expiration of the implementation period.80 The most controver-
sial and problematic feature of the indirect effect of directives is that in 
the Court’s interpretation, indirect effect sometimes almost amounts to 
direct horizontal application, regardless of the contra legem limitation.81
75 Case C-176/12 association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGt and 
Others (18 July 2013), Opinion of AG Villalón.  
76 For the sake of completeness, it has to be added that conform interpretation is not 
strictly limited to the EU law norms without direct effect. If appropriate, directly effective 
EU provisions may also be used for conform interpretation.
77 Cases C-14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[1984] ECR I-1891; C-106/89 Marleasing Sa v La Comercial Internacional de alimentacion 
Sa [1990] ECR I-4135; C-397/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer, Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), Albert Süß 
(C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-
402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut 
eV [2004] ECR I-8835; C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest 
atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre [2012]. 
78 Case C-212/04 Konstantinos adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos 
[2006] ECR I-6057.
79 Dominguez (n 77) para. 25.
80 adeneler (n 78) para. 115.
81 See for instance Cases C-177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vorming-
scentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-3941; C-365/98 Brink-
mann tabakfabriken GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld [2000] ECR I-4619; or some cases con-
cerning the indirect effect of the Unfair Consumer Terms Directive mentioned in footnote 11.
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The Court also found other ways to reach into horizontal relation-
ships. In triangular situations, a private party invokes a directive impos-
ing an obligation on a state which results in affecting the position of a 
third private party.82 Furthermore, the Court broadened the notion of the 
‘state’ which allows the directives to be invoked against a wider range of 
entities.83
3.2 Practice of National Courts 
When looking at the case law of national courts on conform interpre-
tation, it appears that contra legem interpretation is the principal limi-
tation posing problems for national courts. According to a simple rule, 
contra legem interpretation occurs when the court gives effect to the EU 
norm although the EU norm and national norm would contradict each 
other. However, the reality does not always fit the theoretical axioms. 
Conform interpretation appears to be a widespread technique used by 
the national courts; there are probably thousands of decisions where 
national courts have interpreted national law in the light of EU law which 
makes it difficult to derive some valuable generalisations from their prac-
tice. In any case, it can be useful to look at least at some examples of how 
national courts deal with indirect effect and contra legem interpretation.
In the Netherlands, the Council of State has had its say repeatedly 
on the interpretation of Dutch law in conformity with EU law. In a case 
concerning the availability of the location of GMO experiments to the 
public, Dutch law required this information to be kept secret whereas the 
relevant directive required these data to be made available.84 Under these 
circumstances, the Council of State ruled that the national law cannot be 
interpreted in conformity with the directive.85 In another case, the District 
Court of Utrecht had to rule on the conformity of the Dutch Nature Con-
servation Law and the Wild Birds Directive.86 In response to the damage 
caused by Canadian geese, Dutch authorities had granted permission for 
gassing them. Under the Wild Birds Directive, the arrangements or meth-
ods authorised for the capture or killing of the birds must be specified; as 
82 Cases C-201/02 the Queen, on the application of Delena Wells v Secretary of State for 
transport, Local Government and the Regions [2000] ECR I-723; C-152/07 arcor aG & Co 
KG, Communication Services tELE2 GmbH (C-153/07) and Firma 01051 telekom GmbH (C-
154/07) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2008] ECR I-5959.
83 Cases C-188/89 a Foster and others v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313; C-6/05 Medi-
pac-Kazantzidis aE v Venizeleio-Pananeio [2007] ECR I-4557. 
84 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 
on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repeal-
ing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/1.
85 Case No M en R 2010, Council of State (25 November 2009).
86 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 
2009 on the conservation of wild birds [2009] OJ L20/7.
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there was no mention in Dutch law of gassing as a legitimate method to 
capture the birds, the court ruled that the national law did not provide for 
a sufficient legal ground to allow gassing, although the method as such 
did not seem to be in contradiction with the directive.87
The French Court of Cassation interpreted on a number of occasions 
the French Code civil in the light of the Product Liability Directive88 before 
the Directive was actually transposed into French law but after the ex-
piry of the implementation period. Pursuant to Article 1147 of the Code 
civil, a debtor shall be ordered to pay damages if there is occasion, either 
by reason of the non-performance of the obligation, or by reason of delay 
in performing it, whenever he does not prove that the non-performance 
comes from an external cause which may not be ascribed to him, although 
there is no bad faith on his part. Further, in accordance with Article 6 
of the Product Liability Directive, a product is defective when it does not 
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circum-
stances into account, including the presentation of the product, the use 
to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put, 
and the time when the product was put into circulation. By interpreting 
the aforementioned provision of the Code civil in the light of the Product 
Liability Directive, the Court of Cassation came to the conclusion that a 
producer is liable for a breach of his safety obligation in the event of dam-
age caused by the product at the time when it was put into circulation 
and when the product does not provide the safety which could reasonably 
be expected given all the circumstances and, in particular, the presenta-
tion of the product89.
In the above-mentioned case, the court ‘merely’ gave a broader 
meaning to some general notion in national law in order to encompass 
the requirements of the directive. In some cases, the role of the national 
court is more complicated and it has to get down to true brain twist-
ers. This was the case in the transposition of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 93/13 into the Czech legal order and its interpretation by the 
Czech courts. The key provision of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
states that the Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in 
87 Case No LJN BM6676, District Court Utrecht (3 June 2010). For an overview of the case 
law of the Dutch courts on indirect effect in the area of EU environmental law, see JH Jans, 
‘European Environmental Law Before Dutch Courts: Observations on Direct Effect and 
Consistent Interpretation’ (9 December 2011) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1970270> 
accessed 31 March 2014.
88 Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective prod-
ucts [1985] OJ L210/29. 
89 Case No 03-19534, Court of Cassation (Judgment of 24 January 2006). For newer case 
law of the Court of Cassation on the indirect effect of directives, see Case No 12-13503 
(Judgment of 17 December 2013); Case No 12-20982 (Judgment of 22 January 2014); and 
Case No 12-25748 (Judgment of 5 February 2014).
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a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as 
provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer 
(Article 6). The Czech courts had to resolve a number of interpretative 
issues in this respect, concerning the character of the abusive clauses, 
the enforcement of a final arbitration award against consumers, etc. One 
contra legem interpretation problem was caused by Section 55 (2) of the 
Civil Code90 which prior to the amendment by Act No 155/2010 Coll pro-
vided that the provisions in consumer contracts, as defined in Section 
56, should be deemed valid unless the consumer invoked the invalidity 
thereof. In other words, all the contractual provisions non-exhaustively 
enumerated in Section 56(3) of the Civil Code were deemed voidable (the 
consumer had to invoke their invalidity) until 31 July 2010; since then, 
they were considered null and void, regardless of whether or not the con-
sumer invoked their invalidity.  In the Opinion concerning forum-selec-
tion clauses agreed in consumer contracts, the Supreme Court of the 
Czech Republic ruled, that:  
A court of law that arrives, when examining the conditions for 
the proceedings, at the conclusion that the forum-selection 
clause agreed in a consumer contract before July 31, 2010 that 
is to establish the court’s local jurisdiction is in conflict with 
Section 56(1) of the Civil Code shall notify this to the parties to 
the proceedings and invite them to provide their observations 
on this issue within a specified period of time. The court shall 
rule that the forum-selection clause is voidable (Section 55(2) of 
the Civil Code, in the version in force until July 31, 2010) and 
that the procedure described in Section 105 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure should be followed only if the consumer has effectively 
invoked the invalidity of the forum-selection clause. In the event 
that the consumer does not invoke the invalidity of the forum-
selection clause, both direct and indirect application of Directive 
93/13 shall be ruled out.91 
Thus, the Supreme Court emphasised the obligation of the court to 
notify to parties the conflict of the forum-selection clause with the Civil 
Code provisions on consumer protection; however, declaring the forum-
selection clause void without any action on the part of the consumer 
would amount to contra legem interpretation.
90 The new Civil Code as part of the re-codification of Czech private law became effective as 
of 1 January 2014.
91 Case No Cpjn 200/2011, Supreme Court of the Czech Republic (Opinion of 9 October 
2013). English translation available at <www.nsoud.cz>.
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The Supreme Court also dealt with the conform interpretation of the 
Arbitration Act in the light of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. Under 
Section 33 of the Czech Arbitration Act, prior to its amendment by Act No 
19/2012 Coll, the court would reject the application to set aside the arbi-
tration award if the applicant had not raised its objections during the pre-
vious arbitration proceedings, before or when presenting the arguments on 
the merits of the case. By resorting to very strong indirect effect, the Su-
preme Court stated that the court cannot reject the application according 
to Section 33 of the Czech Arbitration Act if the applicant is a consumer.92
Certainly, the best example of how differently (or identically) the na-
tional courts of different Member States perceive the limits of indirect 
effect would be to compare their interpretation of similar national provi-
sions in conformity with the same EU norm. The European Arrest War-
rant saga may provide a useful example in this respect. As the constitu-
tions of the Member States in most cases prevented the extradition of 
nationals or provided that their citizens may not be forced to leave their 
home country, the implementation measures were challenged before the 
national courts. While the Czech Constitutional Court adopted a very EU-
law open approach by way of a harmonious interpretation of the Czech 
Constitution,93 the constitutions in some other Member States (Poland, 
Germany) had to be amended – conform interpretation of the national 
constitutions was excluded as it would amount to interpreting constitu-
tional provisions contra legem.  
3.3 Simplifying the Horizontal Application of EU Law 
At first, it has to be underlined that if the national courts were ex-
empted from the obligation to ex officio interpret national law in the light 
of directives as was suggested in the previous section, the probable result 
would be a decrease in the number of cases concerning the (indirect) ap-
plication of directives. In other words, such a measure would produce a 
spill-over effect, facilitating the work of national judges and simplifying 
the domestic application of EU law in general. In certain cases, however, 
national courts would still have to deal with these issues, typically when 
one of the parties to the proceedings (a private person) invokes a direc-
tive or a general principle of EU law expressed in a directive in a dispute 
against another private person.94      
92 Case No 33 Cdo 1201/2012, Supreme Court of the Czech Republic (Judgment of 20 
June 2013). Act No 19/2012 Coll, enacted before the Supreme Court’s decision amended 
the Czech Arbitration Act so that the rule enshrined in Section 33 does not apply if the ap-
plicant is a consumer.
93 Case No Pl. ÚS 66/04, Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Judgment of 3 May 
2006).
94 Under the condition that national law permits raising legal arguments at that stage of 
the proceedings.
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As for the general principles of EU law, notwithstanding the heated 
debates provoked by the Mangold-type case law and the codification of 
the general principles in the legally binding Charter, it seems that the 
application of general principles between individuals remains of limited 
importance for national courts. Courts of lower instances do not usually 
embark on far-reaching and convoluted analysis of the legal principles of 
the national legal system, even less the general principles of EU law.95 A 
number of Member States are currently engaged in the process of reform 
of their justice systems to render them more effective.96 The reasons are 
obvious: the courts’ workloads are tending to rise, and more and more 
courts face pressure to reach quick decisions (in order to ensure, in-
ter alia, compliance with the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights) at the expense of quality. In this context, it seems likely that an 
ambiguous case law, as is the Court’s jurisprudence on the horizontal ap-
plication of general principles of EU law, will fall on deaf ears in national 
courts. The application of general principles of EU law could be more rel-
evant, at least for the courts of higher instances, especially constitutional 
courts, which deal regularly with the scope and effects of (constitutional) 
legal principles and could therefore be more open to the idea of the ap-
plication of general principles of EU law. The latter case law of the Court 
also suggests, perhaps also under the criticism of the previous case law, 
that the application of general principles of EU law and their application 
between individuals is rather restricted. For example, in audiolux, the 
Court refused to recognise the equal treatment of shareholders as a gen-
eral principle of EU law.97 In the above-mentioned recent case association 
de médiation sociale, the Court did not grant the horizontal direct effect 
of the worker’s right to information and consultation enshrined in the 
Charter. In sum, the relevance of the Court’s case law on the horizontal 
application of general principles is questionable for the daily practice of 
national courts. If a national judge wants to become well-versed in this 
puzzling area of EU law and seeks to apply general principles in line with 
the Court’s case law, he or she has to invest quite a lot of energy in order 
to properly understand the nuances of this jurisprudence (even if this is 
possible at all). In other words, there is a high degree of risk of misinter-
preting the Court’s findings, even more so when there is no general con-
sensus about what the Court intended to say in some cases concerning 
the horizontal application of general principles.  
95 As an illustration, it may be worth mentioning that from the 774 judgments collected by 
the International Department of the Czech Supreme Court for the purposes of the analysis 
of the application of Union law by the Czech civil courts between 2009-2011 (see footnote 
43), no judgment contained a reference to the Mangold-type case law or analysis of the 
horizontal application of the general principles of EU law.
96 See Commission, ‘The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard’ COM (2014) 155 final.
97 Case C-101/08 audiolux Sa e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert Sa (GBL) and Others and 
Bertelsmann aG and Others [2009] ECR I-9823.
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Having regard to the frequent occurrence of conform interpretation, 
the situation is different when it comes to the indirect effect of directives 
as a way of reaching into horizontal relationships. As previously suggest-
ed, the most complicated issue for a national judge in this regard is the 
potential interpretation of national law contra legem. A judge has to deal 
with the question to what extent the national law can be twisted, where 
the borderline is between conform interpretation and a complete change 
of meaning of a national provision.
Regarding the above-outlined case law of the national courts, several 
types of harmonious interpretation depending on the proximity to contra 
legem interpretation can be distinguished. 
In the first group of cases, national law contains a general rule or a 
broad (legal) notion; interpreting national law in the light of a directive 
does not do any violence to the wording of the national provision. The 
above-described case law of the French Court of Cassation concerning 
the conform interpretation of the Code civil in the light of the Product Li-
ability Directive can serve as an example. 
The opposite extreme is when the national norm more or less clearly 
contradicts the norm used in a directive and the ‘bending’ of a national 
provision could very probably be regarded as contra legem. The case de-
cided by the Council of State of the Netherlands, where the Dutch law 
required keeping the information about the location of GMO experiments 
secret whereas the relevant directive required making these data avail-
able, illustrates this quite nicely. 
Between these two extremes lies quite a big group of cases where 
things are more ambiguous. The aforementioned decisions of the Czech 
Supreme Court on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive represents dilem-
mas of this kind, where opinion on whether the conform interpretation 
of national law amounts to contra legem interpretation would probably 
vary among lawyers. The Court’s case law does not provide much guid-
ance on this issue, given that it usually leaves this question to national 
courts except in a rather limited number of cases where the contradiction 
between national law and a directive is obvious.98 It is specifically this, 
at times, vague distinction between the indirect effect and direct effect of 
directives which is a source of confusion. Essentially, the Court should 
contribute to the clarification of these issues and to hold a rather reticent 
approach as to deriving extensive rights from directives capable of being 
invoked in disputes between individuals notwithstanding a lack of legal 
basis in national law. This applies also to national judges who should in 
98 See Case C-334/92 teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de garantía salarial  [1992] ECR 
I-06911; Case C-286/06 Impact v Minister for agriculture and Food and Others [2008] ECR 
I-2483, or the above-described association de médiation sociale (n 73).
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these borderline cases attempt to find a solution respecting the difference 
between the indirect and direct effect of a directive and to avoid a decision 
that would surprise the parties. Moreover, except for cases of full harmo-
nisation, the character of directives in principle allows national judges 
when dealing with the indirect effect of a directive to adopt a solution 
which is in tune with national needs and reflects national particularities, 
and judges should feel encouraged to do so. To use the example of the 
indirect effect of EU consumer legislation, the extent to which a national 
judge will interpret national law in the light of EU directives may depend 
presumably (among other things) on the traditional level of consumer 
protection in a given Member State (arguably, this level varies among 
Member States). Unless any systematic solution is provided, the ‘simplifi-
cation’ can more or less consist only in providing these rough guidelines, 
reminding national judges that the main characteristics of a directive, 
as an (mere) indirect form of legislation, should preferably be preserved.
The Court has created a number of loopholes in the prohibition of 
the horizontal direct effect of directives. Although these exceptions might 
have been justified by circumstances in individual cases, in terms of the 
domestic application of EU law the Court’s approach is not desirable. The 
cases where the Court adheres to its settled case law usually do not ap-
pear in the spotlight; by contrast, the controversial ones are intensively 
discussed and therefore more noticeable. In these cases, the Court oc-
casionally uses general principles to circumvent the prohibition of the di-
rect effect of directives or it blurs the distinction between indirect and di-
rect effect (eg in some consumer cases where the indirect effect of certain 
consumer directives almost amounts to direct application in the Court’s 
interpretation). These inconsistencies may contribute to the confusion 
of national judges and to divergences in national practice. After all, it 
comes as no surprise that we can from time to time encounter judgments 
of national courts in which they apply directives in the disputes between 
individuals without any hesitation. 
It follows from the above that it is predominantly up to the Court to 
take into account the particularities of the application of Union law in 
the Member States and to try to keep the rules governing the application 
of EU law between individuals simple and clear. This holds true mainly 
for the case law on general principles which represents a good source of 
inspiration for academic writing but is less suitable for implementation 
by national courts. If parties to the proceedings do not know which of the 
general principles of EU law are going to be applicable, they cannot frame 
their disputes in national courts, and, consequently, national courts are 
left without appropriate guidance. Therefore, it should be sufficiently 
specified which general principles of EU law may be applied in private 
disputes and under what circumstances; preferably, their applicability 
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should be restricted. As for the intricacies of contra legem interpretation, 
the concerted and strengthened effort of European institutions and na-
tional authorities to ensure the better compliance of national transposi-
tion provisions with the directives, as proposed in the previous section, 
should contribute to a decrease in the number of cases where national 
courts encounter difficulties in interpreting national law in the light of 
directives.                     
4. WHY: Enhancing the proper application of EU law in the Member 
States
There is a little doubt that continuing European integration will lead 
to the growing complexity of the Union’s legal order. Accordingly, as the 
EU expands, the range of its activities and the number of legislative acts 
adopted by the EU will steadily grow. With this perspective, it can be 
assumed that the role of national judges in enforcing EU law within na-
tional legal orders will continue to bear importance. 
As previously suggested, even after decades of European integration 
and the simultaneous application of European law in the Member States, 
the number of yet undetermined issues and misinterpretations concern-
ing the principles of the domestic application of Union law remains sur-
prisingly high. Still, misconceptions about the principle of supremacy of 
EU law can be observed,99 and national judges cannot be entirely sure 
when the principle of effectiveness should prevail over the principle of 
equivalence in the area of procedures and remedies for the enforcement 
of EU law based rights, when the court has to raise points of EU law of 
its own motion, how to apply some EU legislation in relations between 
private persons, what the limitations of the application of legal principles 
between individuals are, what the scope of the obligation is to revoke a 
national final administrative decision or judgment which is not compliant 
with EU law,100 etc. 
It would probably be an exaggeration to say that we are witness to 
some sort of systematic loophole in the application of EU law in the Mem-
ber States. On the other hand, the signs that show that disregard for EU 
law or the incorrect application of Union law in national proceedings are 
nothing uncommon should not be ignored either. Before considering po-
tential solutions and proposals for improvement, one should not forget to 
explore the possible reasons for the current situation. For sure, it is rath-
99 S Prechal (n 45).
100 Cases C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517; C-453/00 Kühne & 
Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren [2004] ECR I-837; Joined Cases i-21 Ger-
many GmbH (C-392/04) and arcor aG & Co. KG (C-422/04) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[2006] ECR I-8559.
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er a conglomeration of factors that determine the current state of things, 
ranging from the education and training of legal professionals in EU law 
to the sometimes excessive and chaotic legislative activity of the Union. 
Ideally, national judges should embrace EU law in the same way as they 
do the norms of their national legal order. Various institutional measures 
can be adopted to enhance the awareness of national judges, for example 
introducing training programmes or introducing legal clerks specialized 
in EU law in courts. The issues of the principles of the domestic applica-
tion of EU law are sometimes overlooked in this respect. Undoubtedly, 
national judges are professionals designated to manage the complicated 
legal cases and they should be able to cope with the demanding require-
ments imposed upon them. However, EU law at times imposes upon na-
tional judges very burdensome obligations which may, as practice shows, 
discourage them from applying EU law at all. Simplification of the princi-
ples of the domestic application of EU law seems a logical step to increase 
the willingness of national courts to apply Union law. Consequently, EU 
law would arguably be applied more frequently in a correct manner. One 
should not forget that, besides courts, all national authorities are also 
bound to apply EU law; unlike in the courts, there are many officers and 
clerks of the national (often local) authorities who are not lawyers and 
who are not educated in law at all. This should also be taken into account 
when formulating the basic principles of the domestic application of EU 
law. At the same time, better monitoring of the domestic application of 
EU law by the Commission, possibly in joint cooperation with responsible 
national authorities, is something to consider. Until now, the Commis-
sion has been rather reluctant to bring infringement proceedings for the 
wrong application of EU law by national courts.101
Simplification of the domestic application of EU law as proposed in 
the previous sections is by no means an all-embracing solution. It should 
rather be viewed as another piece of the jigsaw of possible improvements 
to be adopted to enhance the proper application of EU law.  
5. Conclusion
The ever-growing complexity of the legal environment in contempo-
rary Europe makes it no longer tenable to hold the picture of a judge 
as a specialist who has extensive knowledge of national, European and 
international law and knows how to apply it within the polycentric legal 
order. Moreover, with regard to the number of pieces of EU legislation 
enacted every year, the expected result is the further deepening of these 
intricacies. 
101 See for instance Case C-154/08 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of 
Spain [2009] ECR I-00187.
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In this context, the question which arises is not only about how to 
instruct and train national judges in order to enhance the proper ap-
plication of EU law, but also what can be done by national authorities 
and European institutions in this regard. Easing the burden on national 
judges by simplifying the principles of the domestic application of EU law 
is not an act of compassion but rather of rationality – judges will be more 
inclined to acquire these principles when they are simpler. The idea of 
a district court judge who is concerned on a daily basis with the perfor-
mance of contextual tests, searching for unimplemented or incorrectly 
implemented directives, or tinkering with general principles of EU law, 
does not seem very realistic. 
The aim of this paper was to attempt to show that there are potential 
avenues to take to deal in a simplified way with the domestic application 
of EU law, namely with the obligation to apply EU law ex officio, and the 
application of EU law between individuals. As national courts are the 
only authorities (besides administrative bodies) capable of ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU law in daily legal practice, more attention needs to be 
paid in the years to come to these issues by academia as well as by EU 
institutions and national authorities.       
